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ABSTRACT: The understanding of the unity of the world—in the human and natural sciences, 
and the arts—has remained steadfast from ancient metaphysics to contemporary 
phenomenology: the world is one accidentally and necessarily, as true and false, potentially and 
actually, and categorically. But these four ways of being one can be traced back to how unity is 
or comes to be present and/or absent in anything whatsoever. If presence and absence, however, 
have their common root in implication, then this is how the world is (and why it must be) one—
for unity is implied in everything that is. 
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If the world is, it is one. But the meaning of the one that the world is—this has 
yet to be clarified. For there are many ways in which the unity of the world can 
be, and be spoken and imagined, known and thought. But the unity of these ways 
of being one is implied by that which is sought. And it is only through a 
consideration of this unity, that we can begin to approach why the world is one, 
and the implications therefrom. 
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNITY OF THE WORLD 
And this is why Husserl begins the Ideas with the claim that ‘everything real joins 
together in the unity of the world’ (Hua 3/1, §1). For it is necessary to think our 
world—not just within the phenomenological tradition (as a modification and 
reestablishment of Greek metaphysics, as truly universal ontology), but in the 
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history of philosophy—as the ‘total unity of history, our history’, which ‘animated 
Greek philosophy from its beginnings’.1 
But what is the unity of this world? Or more precisely, how can unity join 
everything real—humans and animals, plants and stones, indeed the whole of 
nature, the motion and rest of the entire cosmos—together in the world? Or is 
there not another way of thinking unity, of going to the unity of the world itself? 
And one that has implications (intentional or not) for phenomenology, for our 
thinking of unity, for the natural and human sciences, and the arts, perhaps even 
for an entirely ‘unquestioned’ philosophical tradition?2 
The world, however, for Husserl, is not simply a matter for Logical Investigations; 
rather, it is a horizon—or more precisely, the world horizon, and in two senses: 
border and boundary. For Husserl takes the metaphor or analogy of the horizon 
 
1 Husserl Hua 6, 72; Hua 9, §16. Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950, 
abbreviated hereafter as Hua. 
2 Hua 6, 47. Science as (positive) concern-for ‘is directed at already known knowledge because knowledge is 
supposed to take over the task of securing existence [Dasein] and culture’; it is concerned about ‘acquiring what 
is true’—and science responds to our ‘human need’ for the security of ‘human Dasein’ by θεωρεῖν, that is, 
seeking the ‘absolutely valid lawfulness’ of ‘absolute certitude’, ‘verum as certum’, justified truth, self-evidence 
qua ‘universally binding’ on ‘all rational beings’, the mathematization-quantification-objectification of all 
beings; which is why all natural-sciences are human-sciences, and why the thematizations-interpretations-
representations-translations of science ‘need to be undone’, reversed-destroyed-destructured-deconstructed 
(Heidegger, Gesammtausgabe. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977, vol. 17, 60, 90-1, 101, 195, 221, 269; abbreviated 
hereafter as GA). The other kind of concern-for is (negative, privative) deficient: ‘neglect itself is something 
that is the concern of care. Neglecting can be characterized as deficient caring’ (GA 17, 90). Although we 
cannot deal with it in depth here, the parallels with Hegel seem obvious: in the Phenomenology of Spirit the 
lord and serf co-determine one another, and their truth lies in their relation, the unity of their concept, 
which is their beginning or origin (not simply their end), out of which their separation has been abstracted, 
insofar as they have always already passed over into one another—just as the Meditations ‘reduces a twofold 
being to a uniformity’; even if ‘the question concerning unity…is, for Descartes, not a problem at all’ (GA 17, 
146, 244). So too with Husserl: subject and object co-determine each other, and their truth lies in their 
relation, ‘a certain circulus’, that is, in intentionality (which Hegel thinks as ‘work’, whereby the serf puts 
themselves into the object; and Heidegger reinterprets as (1) ‘concern-for’, whereby Dasein discloses itself 
as present-in and re-shaping that which it is concerned with, which re-shapes Dasein, and (2) ‘care’ as the 
origin of both concern for something and concern for nothing, or Angst, which discloses the being of care as 
that which makes them possible, which reveals being as their original opening, their ‘seinsmäßiger Ursprung’) 
(GA 17, 115, 173). The goal here seems quite clear: becoming ‘free from’ science, from its disciplines and its 
discipline (rigour), from ‘inherited possibilities and traditional types’, in order to—by returning to the 
‘genuine being of care’ (which is neither its existence nor its essence)—become ‘free for’ human existence 
(GA 17, 112, 117). And as Husserl insists: ‘If Descartes had remained at the second Meditation, he would 
have come to phenomenology’ (GA 17, 268). 
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quite literally. On the one hand, the horizon qua border is always already present 
as that world in which we orient ourselves, live and die, experience and think, as 
the actual (in motion or at rest, fixed and finished or expanding and retracting) 
limit that surrounds us, and so that complete end or background (halo, shadow) 
within which phenomena (subjects and objects) manifest themselves, and come 
to presence as necessarily or possibly known, whether by the natural or human 
sciences, or used by the arts (Hua 3/1, §1). On the other hand, the horizon qua 
boundary is that world to which we relate as potentially unlimited, open and 
continually opening, temporally extended, as a promise of ever-new horizons 
beyond the horizon, other worlds beyond this one, as a middle or threshold-
between (something like earth and sky, or here and there), especially insofar as 
we dream or imagine the unknown, even unknowable. And the world-horizon is 
the original unity of these two senses, border and boundary—for the world serves 
as the horizon of horizons, that which makes them both possible, the basis on 
which both may be constituted. Thus, if a world can be constituted as that in which 
and to which we relate (or correlate), it is because the world is the ‘total-horizon’, 
the ‘originally and constantly self-changing and yet remaining unitary horizon’, 
that is, the world-horizon or horizonal-world of any world whatsoever.3 
Negatively, therefore, there are not two or three, or multiple or infinite worlds; 
or other world beyond (like a Platonic idea, or kingdom of God), and no ‘world 
behind the world’.4 All ‘other worlds’ (such as the Greek or Roman world, the 
Copernican or Newtonian or quantum world, the material world of planet Earth 
or the immediately sensible world, or the sum of all objects therein, or of all these 
worlds, the natürliche Welt, Sachenwelt, Wertwelt, Güterwelt, praktische Welt, Zahlenwelt, 
arithmatische Welt, Dingwelt, Erfahrungswelt, Umwelt, phänomenologische Welt, 
Weltbewusstsein, Welterfahrung, Lebenswelt, etc.) are constituted out of the one and 
only world. And if there were more than one world, it would demand more than 
one word, but the plural makes no sense when applied to the world—rather every 
 
3 Hua 39, 83. Landgrebe 1967, 52. As Geniusas notes: the world qua (transcendental) horizon is the 
wherefrom, wherein and whereto of experience; but the world is only a ‘figure’ of the ‘truly universal’ 
horizon, Totalhorizont (2012, 15, 53, 56, 177-223). In other words, the world is not the origin of the horizon; 
rather horizonality is the origin of the world; and the world can be given only because the horizon has 
always already been pregiven. 
4 Landgrebe 1967, 48. 
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plural and singular presupposes the unity of the world-horizon (Hua 6, §37).5 So 
if the history of philosophy presents or represents the world as φύσις out there 
(whether thought as part of the whole κόσμος or not), transcendent and beyond 
me, ψυχή, somehow opposed to immanence; or as the mundus in which anima is 
deposited in a corpus; or as a res extensa to be sensed and thought by a res cogitans; 
or as an Objekt that stands over and against a Subjekt; or a thing-in-itself of which 
I can know nothing, even if I can intuit the forms of representation according to 
which it can appear and come to presence; or simply as a (subjective or solipsistic) 
result produced or created by my desire or mind or will (as in, for example, 
psychology), or by desire or mind or power itself, independent of me—then it is 
because the world is always already one. Thus, the world is not a world; rather, 
any world (and the multiplicity of worlds in which and to which we relate) can 
only be—and be called—a world, thanks to the world. 
But positively, each and every phenomenon, is here in the world and because 
of the world. Subjects and objects, nature and culture, φύσις and τέχνη, real and 
ideal, facts and fictions, truth and falsity, essence and existence, temporal and 
atemporal, actual and potential, necessary and contingent, possible and 
impossible, all the different domains of (the natural and human) sciences and all 
areas of artistic creation, words and deeds, sense and nonsense, thoughts and 
things, appearing and disappearing, intuition and judgment, Erfahrung and 
Erlebnis—all this is here because the world is there. Whether we take up the 
natural or theoretical attitude, the actual-factual world or a potential-imaginary 
one, whether the spacio-temporal world of the empirical-material sciences (since 
Galileo) or transcendental philosophy, whether we investigate the world (as the 
intentional cogitatum) of conscious experience and appearance or ourselves as the 
cogito in our correlative (corresponding, differential) relation, or the world of 
random fantasies, or what belongs in and for itself to the world, that is, the eidetic 
universalities necessary to any world whatsoever—we can do our part because 
 
5 Or, ‘the world is the originally and constantly self-changing and yet remaining unitary horizon’ (Hua 39, 
83). As Husserl admits, unfortunately or not, his early concentration on the theme of intentional-horizon 
(and the horizon of consciousness, subjectivity, figure-ground, background-foreground, etc.) left the world-
horizon, and the unity of the horizon—which is not simply a metaphor—unthematized (Hua 3, Beilage 13, 
pp. 399-400). 
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the world is doing its part.6 Thus, the world—not just the ‘natural world as a 
correlate of consciousness’, nor merely ‘the spiritual world’ of the transcendental 
ego—is the unity that is there, doing its part, allowing for any possible relation or 
correlation therein, for every coming-together or (always already) belonging-
together, and the constitution thereof; which is how each unification of ideality 
and reality (and any possible science of units) can be meaningful or investigated, 
as well as how we can then respond (ethically or not) to problems (such as global 
warming, the nuclear threat, pandemics, migration, human rights, pollution, 
economic inequality, political oppression, etc.) of the whole-world, Allwelt, at all.7 
The question of What the world is, then, has been answered: it is one, the 
unitary horizon. But the question of How the world is—this question remains. 
For how can the world allow the possibility—and actuality—of the difference 
between subjectivity and objectivity, mental and physical, ideal and real? Or, how 
can the world be given, come to presence as one, and serve as the unity of 
everything and anything that is—including us? 
Husserl answers: the unity of the world is constituted. On the one hand, the 
 
6 As Husserl writes: ‘If all given theoretic unity is in essence a unity-of-meaning, and if logic is the science 
of theoretic unity in general, then logic evidently is the science of meanings as such, of their essential sorts 
and differences, as also of the ideal laws which rest purely on the latter…All theoretical science consists, in 
its objective content, of one homogeneous stuff: it is an ideal fabric of meanings. We can go even further and 
say that the whole, indefinitely complex web of meanings that we call the theoretical unity of science, falls 
under the very category that covers all its elements: it is itself a unity of meaning’ (Hua 19, §29). 
7 Hua 3/1, §§47, 53; Hua 4, §§48-64. For Husserl, the Kantian the world is an idea (1900, IV A334/III B391); 
unity is the law that regulates and guides the idea of world as schematization of the whole. On the one hand, 
as in Kant, idea here means: what cannot be known, but must be thought (as determinable, if not 
determined)—the transcendental ground or condition of the possibility of what I can know or hope, what I 
should do or not (1900, III Bxxvi; IV A771/III B799). On the other hand, (supposedly) going beyond Kant, 
idea is not simply regulative, but constitutive; or more precisely—idea is constitutive because it is (always 
already) regulative, and it is regulative because it is (always already) constitutive. Unfortunately, Husserl’s 
view of Kant as ‘psychological’, drives him to ‘correct’ a Deduction that is not in need of correction (Hua 
3/1, §62); but this is not to mitigate phenomenology’s insights into the intentional structure of consciousness, 
or the discovery of phenomenological description as the possibility of a science of particulars. Additionally, 
it remains to be seen to what extent Hegel’s critique of Kant (qua a subjective psychologism unable to explain 
actual knowledge because of the thing-in-itself) would be equally applicable to Husserl (qua eidetic 
intentionalism unable to explain actual knowledge because of mere correlation). Ricoeur’s view on the 
world—as prior to language (and language games)—seems to follow Husserl’s: ‘Languages do not 
speak…Language is not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, because 
we are affected by situations, and because we orient ourselves comprehensively in those situations, we have 
something to say, we have experience to bring to language’ (Ricoeur 1976, 20-21). 
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world is not simply there before us, an abstract object or objects or objective 
reality, a thing (in itself) or things waiting to be found, like some rock spinning in 
space; nor is it merely made by us, as an artwork might be assembled by some 
artist, some god or gods; nor a composite or combination of μορφή and ὕλη born 
of nature, or determined through the εἶδος of some subject (or subjects) that, 
thereby, merely knows what it puts therein; nor is it just a fact or totality of facts 
(which determine the actual or potential state of affairs of what is or is not the 
case).8 Rather, the world is constituted as the horizon of subject and object, ego 
and non-ego, as the relation of subjectivity and objectivity. For that is what it 
means to be a world: being constituted as one.9 
On the other hand, as constitutive, the world serves as the unity in which and 
to which everything comes to be. Indeed, the world is constituted in its ‘constitutive 
becoming’ as that which makes the constitution of subject and object (and their 
relation, as well as any kind of investigation whatsoever, whether of the arts or 
sciences, meaning or act, experience or imagination) first possible (Fink 1966, 
106). For esse is not simply percipi; being is not merely being perceived—nor is it 
simply there, or here, always already present, or the presence of the present—it 
is far more constituti, being constituted.10 And what is not constituted as well—this 
 
8 Kant 1900, III Bxviii. Wittgenstein 1921, 1.1, 2.01. 
9 Husserl’s critique of the history of philosophy as metaphysics (as ontology, the study of being qua being) is 
a kind of radical return to Berkeley. In order for anything to be, it must show itself, present itself, come to 
presence or be present, and phenomenology is the science of the appearance of what is. But it is on the 
ground of this appearing that experience is possible—for only that which comes to presence and appears 
can be experienced; or, the appearance of phenomena is that which allows us to experience being. But then, 
reciprocally or relatively, there is no experience without an experiencer, and no appearing without someone 
to whom being appears—for experience (as well as sense and meaning) is constituted, or co-constituted, 
through the relation of subject and object; which is why phenomenology insists on a transcendental 
intentional-subject of experience (which Berkeley posits as God, and Kant thinks as transcendental 
apperception) as the possibility of being as appearing in experience. 
10 As Berkeley argues: ‘Esse is Percipi’—for otherwise it could not be perceived: ‘the table I write on I say 
exists—that is, I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study I should say it existed—meaning thereby that 
if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it’ (1974, §3; Ricoeur 
1954, 45). Or, that which is perceived is, and the unperceived is not; nor would we even know that it is 
unperceived—for at the moment that I perceive it as unperceived, it is. No matter how I try to think an 
object of knowledge that I fail to perceive, I cannot perceive it—for I would fall into contradiction with 
myself. And it is impossible for a sound or figure or motion or color to exist without the mind (that is, without 
being perceived, as unperceived); it is inconceivable for me to conceive of an extended movable substance, 
or any idea in general, ‘otherwise than in a mind perceiving it’ (1974, §22). The unconceivable is 
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is constituted qua non-constituted—for non-being, or nothing, is merely a way of 
being, μὴ ὂν a mode of τὸ ὂν, or ‘non-being is non-being’; and what is not 
perceived is not perceived, just as what is absent is present as absent: being is, and 
non-being is not (as Parmenides knows).11 
The world then, is constituted-constitutive—but how so? Or more precisely, 
how is the world one so that it can constitute the difference between us, between 
us and the world, as well as the possibility of the identity of real and ideal, thought 
and thing, subject and object? And how does the world come to be as a 
continually constituted unity, so that we can possibly engage in any natural or 
human scientific investigation, or art, whatsoever?  
As Husserl writes: ‘to constitute’ is ‘to announce oneself ’, that is, ‘to make 
manifest’, sich bekunden.12 Or to paraphrase Schelling: constitution is how the world 
opens its eyes, and ours, realizes that it is one, that we are one with it, whereby 
we both see what we are—for as Goethe reminds us in ‘Epirrhema’: ‘Nothing is 
inside, nothing is outside; / For what is inside is also outside’ (1960, I: 545). Or, as 
Heidegger writes: ‘Here “constituting” does not mean producing qua making and 
fabricating; it means letting a being be seen in its objectivity’ (GA 20, 97)—for 
constitution reveals what is the case, and discloses worldly-beings as coming to 
presence in the unity of their world. Or as Sartre would have it: constitution is a 
‘conspiracy’ (1936, 102) of subjectivity and objectivity. Or as Merleau-Ponty notes 
(after differentiating Husserl’s early intellectual or subjective understanding of 
constitution from his later, as well as static from genetic, passive from active): 
constitution is a kind of ‘primordial pact’; it is participatory or complicit 
explication qua determination of a positively implicit, pre-objective 
 
unconceivable, just as the unthinkable is unthinkable and that which is not, is not: you cannot ‘conceive 
them existing unconcealed’ (1974, §23). So it would be ‘a manifest contradiction that any sensible object 
should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since 
the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived’ (1974, §88). And although Husserl claims 
that Berkeley’s percipi does not include esse as a real component (Hua 3/1, §98)—this is precisely Berkeley’s 
critique of Locke, and ‘the phenomenological reduction consists in making every esse a percipi’ (Burnet 1990, 
6). 
11 Aristotle 1957, 1003b10; 1019b6. Or, as T.S. Eliot writes: ‘World not world, but that which is not world’ 
(Eliot 1963, 179). 
12 Hua 3/1, 174; 15/434, 14/47. On ‘phenomena’ as what presents itself and/or comes to presence as ‘self-
presenting in an absolute sense [Selbstgegenwart im absoluten Sinn]’, see Hua 13, §32. 
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indeterminacy—for to constitute is to collude in order to actualize and 
accomplish, thereby, to ‘explicate and articulate what was until then presented as 
no more than an indeterminate horizon’.13 Just as there is no gift (being) without 
a giver (and receiver), no thinker without a thought, or intuition (or consciousness) 
without an intuited (object of consciousness), the world is the constituted relation 
of subjectivity and objectivity—for this is how ideas are not merely ideal, but just 
as real (which is why—as Berkeley reminds Husserl, perhaps as much as Hume 
Kant—‘we eat and drink ideas’ (1974, §38)). In other words, the world is 
constituted as the unity of everything that is (necessary and possible thoughts and 
things, actual and potential objects and subjects, real and ideal)—for in being 
constituted, the world is explicated, revealed, as having been constituted.14 Thus, 
the constitution of the world is co-constitution—and there is (as Hegel reminds 
us) no lord without a serf, no parent without child, no love without lovers, no 
giving without receiving, which is why Husserl calls it (analogously) the playing 
of a duet, the Spiel of a Doppelspiel (Hua 8, 75; 11, 15)—for our relation to the world 
is constituted out of our difference from the world, a difference of the world from 
itself; but a difference or differential relation, an historical-temporal self-
differentiation and ‘self-manifestation’, a ‘self-givenness’ which is constitutive for 
the being of the world, and our own, and for the unity of the difference between 
us and the world.15 
The world then, announces or shows itself, manifests or presents itself, as 
 
13 Merleau-Ponty 1945; 39, 251, 485. 
14 Hua 11, §4; see 15/131, 287; Ms. C 2 3a; Ms. C 10 15b; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 491-492. More precisely—
although we cannot go into this here—the constituting world constitutes itself. Like the subject, the world 
is self-constituting: ‘The constituting consciousness constitutes itself, the objectivating consciousness 
objectivates itself—and indeed, in such a way that it brings about an objective nature with the form of 
spatiotemporality’ (Hua 15/546). On the intersubjective constitution of the world, see Hua 1/166. Ironically 
or not, Heidegger argues that Kant already understood this: transcendental idealism is the unity of subject 
and object made possible on the ground of the transcendental schema of time (GA 3). And for Husserl, time 
is the universal form of all egological genesis (Hua 1, §37). It is Husserl’s understanding of the presence of 
unity (Hua 19.1, §2), as the essence of the indicative sign (and motivated judgment of the other), experienced 
as the unity of ‘sign and referent’ (Hua 19.1, §10), that Derrida takes as one of deconstruction’s first targets 
(1967a, 75)—especially insofar as signs (and language, mediation, repetition) are supposed to be foreign to 
Erlebnis, purely subjective lived experience (such as that of pain or death, which can only be mine), as well 
as to the pure self-presence of inner monologue (Hua 3/1, §111). 
15 Landgrebe 1949, 202; Wu 2018, 32. 
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being and having been constituted-constitutive, as the origin of the original unity 
of the relation of itself to us. In other words, ‘the origin of the world’—indeed, of 
all being—has been found: it is not, as onto-theology would have it, a matter of 
clarifying ‘beings by beings’ such as Nature or God or some other being, the cogito 
or absolute Geist; rather, the fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum is the world 
itself.16 For the world gives of itself, gives itself to us, with us—and the world is 
only as us, and everything worldly (including us) only comes to be thanks to the 
world. And the world is neither a being (whether an object or substance, thing or 
some other kind of being), nor the beingness of being (whether a concept or idea, 
thought or some other avatar of beingness) because it is (as Heidegger grasps) the 
being of beings, or more precisely, the unity of the being of beings; that is, the 
original difference that differentiates and unites them both, the relation that 
makes the differentiation of world first possible (which is why the so-called 
‘metaphysics’ that happens behind Husserl’s back is transcendental 
phenomenology). In this way, if the world is border or boundary, then it is 
because it is always already absolute, that is, the relational ground and differential 
foundation, reason and cause, the absolute ἀρχή of everything that is and comes 
to be. Thus, not just ‘we are the world’, but also ‘the world is us’; or we are one—
 
16 Fink 1933, 339, 342; Landgrebe 1961, 138; Lawlor 2002, 13-14. In other words, ‘the world remains immanent 
to the absolute’; or, the relation of (transcendent) world-horizon and world-phenomenon to world-origin 
(qua world-ground) is transcendental—for the absolute-world qua world-origin is not outside the world in 
some other world, not separate from the world-horizon, or from us; nor is it inside and contained in the 
world, like water in a glass. Rather, the unity of our relation to the world (qua transcendental knowledge) is 
only possible on the ground of ‘a higher unity’, that is, the unity of the originally transcendental world (Fink 
1933, 357). It remains to be considered whether the world is a being, albeit a very special one, which would 
mean that Husserl clarifies beings by beings—and fails thereby, to clarify being itself, that is, what and how 
being, and the being of the world, is and is one. Then the world would merely be a secularized avatar of 
God (or the gods, spirit or absolute Spirit), which could compromise Husserl’s attempt to overcome onto-
theology, which is perhaps why Fink writes: ‘Is man therefore the absolute? Not at all. But neither is the 
absolute a “transcendent” reality beyond man and not encompassing him. Separating and distinguishing 
them is as false as their direct equation. In place of a “transcendent” relation between man and the world-
ground we must posit a “transcendental” relation which does not overlook man’s worldly finitude, frailty, 
and impotence, but which comprehends it as a constituted meaning, thereby taking it back into the infinite 
essence of spirit’ (Fink 1933, 383). Or, as Landgrebe argues: it is the ‘historical becoming’ of ‘the world, and 
not merely beings in the world’, which the tale or poem of the history of philosophy recounts—but 
unfortunately, ‘because Husserl, despite his criticism of Descartes, remains secretly stuck to the modern metaphysical concept-
of-substance, his analysis of self-consciousness, and therewith the departure from metaphysics, remain incomplete’ (Landgrebe 
1961, 155, 172). 
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and the origin of the world is the world itself, its self-originating, self-
differentiating, self-presencing; or more precisely, the self-giving of the world that 
has also always already been given. 
And yet, if the world is one—neither a being nor a unit, but the unity of 
beings—then what is this unity of the world? Or rather, if unity is the how of the 
world, the way the world is—and so, how it is constituted-constitutive—then how 
can unity be original? In other words, what is the relation between the sense of 
the unity of the world as finite and its sense as infinite? And does this not mean 
that, like Plato’s second sailing: everything said about the world must be said, or 
said again—or rather, said first—about its unity? 
Indeed, the world is one means the horizonal-unity of the world qua that in/to 
which we relate, whether in the sciences or arts or in anyway whatsoever, is 
grounded on (the absolute-unity of) the world itself. And this unity is not merely 
a contradiction or paradox, problem or aporia; on the contrary, it is the truth of 
the world, the being of its being. Just as a horizon is both in motion (always 
receding or approaching) and at rest (always there, present); or as a river is limited 
by its form, its banks and bedrock and surface, at stasis and in genesis, static and 
dynamic, fixed and flowing; so too, the world (as an absolute unity) is both 
structurally finite and historically infinite—for motion and rest, static and 
dynamic, fixed and flowing, are merely (constituted-constitutive) ways in which 
the unity of the world manifests itself phenomenologically. 
On the one hand, the horizonal unity of the world is constituted on the 
ground of the world’s absolute unity. And being is not simply the ground of the 
world’s unity; rather, the unity of the world is constitutive for its being, thereby 
making the unification of beings first possible, as well as the relation or correlation 
between us and the world, our identity and difference. In other words, the unity 
of being and beings is itself constituted thanks to the unity of the world—for as 
Husserl insists: the world is the ‘universal permanent ground-of-being’, which 
announces itself as ‘the universal field of all our activities’, scientific or pre-
scientific, speaking or acting, knowing or imagining, whether with regard to the 
real or the ideal, object or concept, interested or disinterested, empirical or 
transcendental, (sensuous) seeing with the eye or (eidetically) with the mind 
alone—although normally, in the natural attitude, we notice neither the unity of 
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the world, nor its concealed co-positing or correlation, nor its bond-to-being.17 
Thus, the unity of the being or non-being of things, the existence or non-existence 
of others, of us and our horizons, of our Eigensein and Eigenwesen, is constituted on 
the ground of the absolute unity (the presence or non-presence of the 
identification and differentiation—and so any predication or judgment 
whatsoever, whether in the arts or sciences) of the world (Hua 3/1, §33). 
On the other hand, the absolute unity of the world is constitutive for the unity 
of the horizon and us, for the inner-worldly difference of subject and object, of 
subjective being (Sein als Bewuβtsein, Sein als Erlebnis) and objective being (Sein als 
Realität, Sein als Ding)—as well as, for the possibility of transcendence, (truth as) 
correspondence, correlation, knowledge, identity, as well as intentional analysis 
as the explication of the implicit, unfolding of the folded, clearing of the unclear.18 
For as Husserl insists: ξυμβάλλειν εἰς ἕν is only possible thanks to an original ἕν 
(Hua 19, §31). In this way, absolute unity is constitutive for being: everything that 
is (objects and subjects, things of any sort) emerges, arises, steps forward and 
announce itself qua constituted (whether as it is or is not, as present or absent). 
Thus, it is the unity of being that allows the being of disunity, the different modes 
of being to be differentiated, the kinds of beings to be constituted, and the diverse 
modes of consciousness to diversify (and so to function)—for being is always the 
being of that which is constituted as being one, so knowable as one (adequately 
 
17 Husserl 1939, §89. 
18 Hua 3/1, §42; Hua 1, §20. Methodological considerations are, therefore, addressed by the world’s absolute 
unity: the phenomenological reduction reveals that which was always already the case, namely, that the 
world is the origin of thought, and so makes possible the thinking of the relation of thought to being, 
foreground to background, inner-worldly beings to their horizon, as well as the correspondence of concept 
and object, and the correlation of both the historically becoming and the static being of us and the world. 
If the concept of unity were developed inside the world, then it could not be applied to the world as a 
unity—but (to paraphrase Kant) just because unity is grounded on the world, and our knowledge of the 
concept of unity begins with the world, neither means that it is to be found in the world (like some kind of 
fish in water), nor that it arises out of the world (1900, III B1). In other words, in/out and inside/outside are 
prejudices derived from sensuous experience and may only metaphorically be used to criticise Husserl’s 
method. It is far more that phenomenology—following Kant’s transcendental philosophy—uncovers the 
condition of the possibility of all the arts and sciences (however reductive or reifying they might be): for 
example, ‘figuratively’, Darwin discovers the concept of natural selection (or survival of the fittest) within 
nature, and can rightly apply it to all of nature, because it is not inside nature at all, although he finds it in 
his life-world; rather, natural selection is grounded on nature, which arises out of the natural world, and 
makes Darwin’s discoveries first possible thereby. 
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or not), whereby knowledge as the unity of us and the horizonal unity of the world 
is first possible. 
For Husserl then, ‘to be one’ means ‘to be constituted-constitutive’—and that 
is to announce the unity of the world, to make the world’s unity manifest, to show 
that the world is one, that we are one, to demonstrate that there is one world-
horizon, and that our difference is one. Whether in this way or that, in one mode 
or another (so given, or like a seductive Reiz, or even pregiven), whether as the 
form of lawful regularity, as concept or object, category of inner or outer sense, 
copula or predicate, or as the present ‘state-of-affairs’, or one that comes to 
presence (like a tone), or a non-present state-of-affairs, so absent (like a 
remembered tone); whether more or less adequately given in experience (and in 
accordance with essential structures), or originally in pure intuition—the absolute 
world reveals itself to be and to have been one, to be becoming and to have 
become as one; which is why phenomenology (as Phänomeno-Logie) seeks ‘radical 
and universal knowledge-of-the-world’, that is, it reveals the ‘logos of  the phenomenon-
of-the-world’.19 Thus, to be constituted and to have been constituted as a unity, and 
to be (as well as to have been) the horizon for any possible investigation—this 
means to be one absolutely.20  
But being one—what is that? In fact, it is not what is, but how so. And things 
are one, or come to be one, because this is how being (the world and everything 
therein) is and comes to be, and so announces the unity of what is and has been; 
it is the act that actualizes and has actualized being (and the becoming of 
beings)—for the world is the unity of being, and being is always ‘Sein in der Welt’, 
 
19 Fink 1966, 139, 164, 170. 
20 With respect to givenness, Kant writes: ‘In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of 
knowledge my relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to 
which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to 
us…objects are given to us by means of sensibility…because in no other way can an object be given to us’ 
(1900, IV A19/III B33; my emphasis). And then, with regards to intentionality, Husserl argues that it ‘makes 
no difference what sort of being we give our object’, as long as we give it some sort, whether real or ideal, 
present or absent, transcendent or immanent, possible or impossible (Hua 19, 427; my emphasis; see Hua 
19.2, §44; 3/1, §24). On the deconstruction of the realist-idealist interpretation of Husserl and 
phenomenology as a metaphysics of the given qua pure and original presentation—albeit one that 
apparently ignores the constitution of givenness, and how being is constituted as given—see, Derrida 1967a, 
50n; Benoist 1997, 228, 274. 
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being in the (one) world (Hua 3/1, §1, §142). As Husserl insists: being is a 
becoming, that is, a process in accordance with essential laws; and the unity of 
being is the ‘constant genesis [beständige Genesis]’ of everything that is (Hua 11, 339-
340). So unity is the continuous becoming, Werden, of being—for phenomenology 
is not simply static Platonism (although it may find clues in a ‘structuralist’ 
philosophy of a priori essences); it is the concrete phenomenology of constant 
genesis (analogous to the Aufhebung of Hegelian history, but stripped of Geist and 
Idee) grounded in the self-announcing unity of the logical, egological, and 
‘thorough-going teleological reason’ of the history of the absolute world which 
shows itself as the continuous Urprozess of active and passive Urkonstitution.21 Thus, 
the absolute-world is a ‘living’ unity, temporally and aspectually becoming what 
it is—and the ‘common root’ of the transcendental structure and historical 
genesis of the unity of the world is to be found in the absolute-continuity of the 
absolute-unity of the world (which is how it is one, especially if it is neither the 
necessary closure of finite totality, nor the opening of infinity possibilities, or 
impossibilities; but rather, the continuous flow of both, which is how it continues 
to be one).22 
And yet, what is continuous in the continuity of the unity of the world? In the 
constant constituted-constituting structure of world history; which is constitutive, 
 
21 Hua 1, §37; Hua 6, Beilage III, 386; Derrida 1967b, 232, 246. The constancy of genesis, however, is—as 
I have argued in Unity and Aspect (Haas 2018a)—irreducible to a temporal determination; on the contrary, 
consistency is just as aspectual, the way in which genesis happens at anytime whatsoever. 
22 GA 18, 311; see, GA 14, 17-18. Heidegger insists: ‘[the] being present of something[—]absence is 
constitutive for this presence, absence in the sense of deficiency, lack. This being-there in the sense of lack 
is completely its own and positive. If I say of someone: “I miss him very much, he is not there”, I precisely 
do not mean to say that he is not there, but express a quite particular way that he is there for me’. For what can 
be announced or made manifest, that is, the unity of the world—this must already have been somehow 
present (given as announceable, or ‘pre-given’ as open to manifestation, pre-announced or pre-manifested), 
at least if it is to be the constituted-constitutive horizon of subjectivity and objectivity alike (indeed, of 
anything and everything that is). And it is this privileging of presence that motivates Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the philosophy of presence, and its understanding of being or becoming as presence (to 
which he claims Husserl belongs): on the one hand, analogous to Augustine’s analysis of time, absence is 
only thought on the basis of presence, which clarifies how that which is not present can still be—by being-
absent; on the other hand, the possibility of absence, non-being, nothingness, non-presence (as well as the 
non-now, past and future, the non-possible or impossibility, the non-self or other, heterogeneity, difference, 
etc.), is undercut or metamorphosed, translated or transmuted into presence—and there is no absence that 
is not a modification of presence; or absence is simply presence, a ‘strange presence’ as an even more devious 
means for maintaining the privilege of presence (Derrida 1967b, 242; Derrida 1972, 33-34). 
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thereby, for the horizon of any possible investigation of the world, whether in the natural 
or human sciences, or the arts? That is, what is the ‘common root’ of the constantly 
changing and remaining the same, the identity and the difference, the stasis and 
genesis, the structure and history, of the world—if there is one? Or more 
precisely: how is the world one? And how is the unity of the world to be thought 
and spoken? For the question here is not just with regard to the unity of the 
world—it is about the unity of the world. 
THE UNITY OF UNITY 
In fact, to answer the question of unity, Husserl looks to the Greeks, to 
Aristotle, to the ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν.23 And being neither a unit nor a collective of units 
(just as being is not a being) nor a collectiva of units; unity is neither an object 
nor a subject, neither simply objective nor subjective, neither merely abstracted 
from the real nor simply ideal (as in Platonism, or what Alexander of Hales 
understood as the ens perfectissimum), neither a Gedanken nor a Ding; nor is it 
just a predicate or (empirical or transcendental) concept, nor just a genus, nor the 
(highest) genus of genera.24 For unity ‘transcends all generic universality’25, and: 
 
23 Arisotle 1957, 990b7-8. Husserl 1939, §87c, 414. Fuchs 1930, 49. 
24 Hua 19.2, §51; Husserl 1939, §92-93. Kant 1900, IV A598; III B 626. Fuchs 1930, 49. On Husserl’s 
Aristoteleanism, see Heidegger GA 26, §9-10. 
25 Heidegger GA 2, §1. Although Heidegger ‘still clings’ to the Husserlian problematic of the temporal 
horizon in Being and Time, he simultaneously exceeds it in the thinking of being at the origin qua absolute 
transcendens (GA 2, 51; Geniusas 2012, 235). By the time of texts such as ‘Time and Being’, however, time is 
just as original as being—for they are both implications; and the origin of the problem of generating 
horizonal-difference has been traced back to the more original problem of the universality of origins (GA 
14). Of course, as the reduction reveals, for Husserl (and Derrida, and all the other philosophers of 
difference), the origin—whether being or event, givenness or pregivenness, or some other origin—can only 
be, come to presence and show itself, in relation to the non-origin, non-being, non-presence or absence and 
non-showing (just as there is no foreground without background, no ergon without parergon, no Erlebnis 
without Erlebnisstrom, no speaking without silence, no identity without difference, etc.). Thus, the originality 
of the origin is unoriginal (which problematises the very possibility of anything original whatsoever, 
especially insofar as it is framed or reframed—and thereby translated—into that which can be enframed, 
presumably at the cost of excluding everything beyond the frame, anything that cannot be translated into 
the language and logic of original-unoriginal). And the danger lies in thinking difference as original-
difference (which Derrida seeks to avoid with différance), or horizon as origin (which Husserl tries to parry 
with genetic phenomenology and transcendental history, as Hegel did with dialectic)—for as Heidegger 
argues: difference as perduration (fulfillment, resolution) is present, Austrag west, and this is a circle, the 
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… it is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of beings; for the 
differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being and be one, but it is not possible for 
the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated 
of its proper differentia; so that if unity or being is a genus, no differentia will either have being 
or be one.26 
Rather, unity is a universal principle through which the (natural- or 
scientific-, logical- or social-, home- or life-) world and inner-worldly beings are 
(statically or genetically) one, and so the horizon of our (subjective or inter-
subjective) experience (and the world itself), as well as how we see and investigate 
the unity of beings (in constant becoming), the one in the many, whether in the 
arts or sciences. 
But then, how are we to think unity as universal? Aristotle answers: the study 
of being, of being qua being, τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν, ontology—not onto-theology, which is 
 
circularity of the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics (objective and subjective genetive); so the task 
is neither to avoid or parry it, nor to get out of it, but rather to get into it in the right way (GA 11, 74-5). 
Implication is an attempt to problematize these problems—for it is neither origin nor horizon, neither 
identity nor difference, neither present nor absent (nor some combination or permutation thereof); rather, 
it is a third thing, neither/nor, and so that out of which both originality and horizonality come, which 
implicates both history (temporality) and survival (aspectuality), as well as being and unity (Haas 2018a, 
16ff).  
26 Aristotle 1957, 998b22-27. As Heidegger notes: the entire history of Western philosophy is prejudiced by 
a self-evident understanding and somehow motivated interpretation of being in terms ‘genus and exemplar’ 
(GA 17, 114). And Husserlian phenomenology does not fare much better—for ‘all interest here is diverted 
directly to forming a fundamental-science and to considering beings from the outset with a view to their 
suitability as the theme of this fundamental-science. Being in the sense of being-a-region for science misplaces 
more than ever the possibility of letting beings be encountered in their character-of-being’ (GA 17, 270). 
And phenomenology’s insight into intentionality (as our, the subject’s, consciousness’ way of being) blocks 
it from thinking us prior to this interpretation: ‘from the outset, Dasein cannot be primarily taken in any 
sense at all through the phenomenon of intentionality. From the outset, the phenomenon of intentionality 
is directed at seeing something as directed towards something’—and fails, therefore, to allow ‘Dasein qua 
Dasein to encounter itself’, that is, to experience how it is, its existence, its way of existing, of coming-to-
presence (GA 17, 284, 287). For example, according to Heidegger, unlike fear, Angst is precisely not related 
to something, some intentional object; on the contrary, it is a way of being threatened by nothing (and so, 
by the uncanny, by the question of existence itself, even if we defend-ourselves-against-ourselves). In sum, 
‘Dasein is the sort of being that, if it is to be determined in an ontologically adequate way, basically cannot 
be determined as a being that one has, but instead as that very being that one is’ (GA 17, 287). Of course, 
for Husserl, non-intentional consciousness is an abstraction-reification, a (somehow motivated) 
interpretation—and a non-relational, isolated, empty consciousness would not be consciousness, just as a 
cogito sans cogitatum would be no cogito at all. Thus, Blumenberg can argue that being able to have something, 
without having to be it, constitutes the very power and value of (non-canibalistic) consciousness as ‘the organ 
for not-devouring the world, and still not failing to possess and enjoy it’ (1987, 22). 
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why Book IV of the Metaphysics remains free from any real discussion of the 
divine νόησις νοήσεως νόησις as it appears in Book XII—is the clue to any 
understanding of unity, unity qua unity, henology: 
Now, if being and unity are the same and are of one nature in the sense that they 
are implied by one another as principle and cause, but not in the sense that they 
have the same definition (though it makes no difference even if we suppose them 
to be like that—in fact this would even strengthen our case); for ‘one man’ and 
‘man’ are the same thing, and so are ‘existent man’ and ‘man’ and the doubling of 
the words in ‘one man and one existent man’ does not express anything different (it 
is clear that the two things are not separated either in coming to be or in ceasing to 
be); and similarly ‘one existent man’ adds nothing to ‘existent man’, so that it is 
obvious that the addition in these cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing 
apart from being; and if, further, the substance of each thing is one in no merely 
accidental way, and similarly is from its very nature something that is:—all this 
being so, there must be exactly as many species of being as of unity.27 
Indeed, being is one, but unity also is. So unity is thought to belong to being 
as much as being to unity—for being and unity imply one another. And this is 
why, in the Metaphysics, the entire ontology, the study of being (Bk. IV, Γ; Bk. VII, 
Ζ; Bk. V, Ch. 7), is repeated as henology (Bk. X, Ι; Bk. V, Ch. 6)—for if ‘being is 
spoken in many ways’ (1003b5), then so too, ‘unity is spoken in many ways’ 
(1052a15). Being is one and unity is, and unites beings, which is why: not only real 
or true being, being itself, essential being, τὸ ὄντως ὄν; but each being, τι, 
particular things—these too, are always also one.28  
And as Brentano reminds us, therefore, if there are four senses of being—all 
related πρὸς ἕν to being itself, οὐσία, presence as the ‘common root’, the ens 
commune—then there are four senses of unity.29 So the essential modifications of 
being qua being are also the essential modifications of unity qua unity. Or more 
precisely, there are not just many ways of speaking or thinking about being and 
unity (Aristotle 1957, 1003a33); rather, being and unity are one, which implies that 
 
27 Aristotle 1957, 1003b22-34; 1053b25. For Fink (1990, 149), Husserl’s failure to consider the being and 
essence, Wesen, of the unity of the world is striking: ‘The astounding thing is that a philosophy, which begins 
with the proclamation that it wants to observe everything in an unbiased and presuppositionless way, takes 
the peculiar Wesen of the world so little into consideration’. 
28 Plato 1995, Phlb., 58a, 59d; Soph., 1995, 237d6-7. 
29 Brentano 1862, 6; Heidegger, GA 17, 51; Owens 1951, 118-123, 259-275. 
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they come-to-presence and go-out-into-absence, manifest and announce and 
show themselves, in four ways: accidental, true, potential-actual, categorical 
(συμβεβηκός, ἀληθὲς, δυνάμει-ἐνέργεια, κατηγορία). 
First, accidental unity is not necessary, but merely happens to be the case, quid 
facti, not quid juris: if I am just, I may be musical and a house-builder, but neither 
because I am just, nor because I am musical, nor because I am a house-builder; 
so that these qualities come to presence as one, but are neither inseparable from 
each other, nor from my substance or essence. Or, my body may be one, but 
there is no a priori reason for its unity, and it is perfectly possible that it could be 
otherwise, now or in the past or the future. In this sense, there is no necessary 
connection between the world and its unity—for not only is the world divisible 
into parts and wholes, presumably governed by one law (or a unity of laws, which 
could be otherwise); but it is perfectly possible that, one day, the continuous 
becoming of the world comes to an end, that the world ceases to be, or that it no 
longer continues to be a whole or part, or wholes and parts.30 
Second, true unity is not just the corresponding or correlating of an object 
that is judged or understood, presented or represented, determined or defined, 
as the same as, or identical to, a (subjective) concept (Aristotle 1957, 1027b20); 
rather, it is the relation itself (ὁμοίωσις, adaequatio), the truth of the inseparability 
of concept and object, that which lets correlation correlate (or be constituted as 
correlative) and correspondence correspond. A thing itself, a human being or the 
world, is one not because I assert it to be so, nor because it agrees with my concept 
(of, for example, ζῷον λόγον ἔχον—thus, not because it is a living being that has 
reason or language, anima or animation); rather, if it agrees with my concept or 
judgment, it is because truth is (always already continuously present as) the unity 
of concept and object (whether simple substance immediately grasped by pure 
seeing, or revealed over time as adumbrated), knowledge and known, experience 
and experienced, sign and referent, intuition and intuited, the inseparability (at 
 
30 On unum per accidens, see for example, Leibniz 1875-90, 2:76, letter from 28 November/8 December, 1686. 
Later, Leibniz rethinks actual unity as unity per se (a sheep, not a flock of sheep), that is, genuine or substantial 
unity (independent of external union), which is also that of the monad or Cartesian soul (1875-90, 2: 76, 120; 
4: 395); and the unity of a body is not merely extention (and divisibility, so flexibility and changeability, as 
Descartes might have it), but the continuous/repetitive aspect—at one and the same time—of primary 
matter (4: 393-4). 
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least in truth) of what is thought with the thought thereof—and ignorance, error, 
nonsense, falsehood is their privation, separation, disunity. In this way, the world 
is truly one insofar as its unity manifests itself to be and to have been continuous, 
a constant presence, which is how it continues to reveal itself as being and having 
been one, announces that it is inseparable from itself, and shows itself as 
indivisible in itself (and how it always allows itself to be divided in thought, 
subjectively, whether in scientific knowing or for practical reasons or in the arts; 
and how it can come to presence as objectively differentiated into objects or 
events, or inner-worldly beings and their worlds, us and our horizons). For the 
true unity of the world lies in the continuity of its genesis, in what is continuous 
(being) in its becoming, or how the world continues to be one. 
Third, unity in the sense of potential and actual are not merely the logically 
possible and necessary (which does not violate the law of non-contradiction, 
which would be the impossible)—rather, they refer to ways of being one. So the 
unity of the potential comes to presence (discontinuously) as not-yet-present, but 
far more continues to be absent, to be one in absence; while the unity of the actual 
is continuously present as one, insofar as the τέλος is accomplished in the work, 
ἐν-έργεια, in the act, ἐν-τελέχεια (Aristotle 1957, 1048a18-36). In other words, 
being one, a unity, is not just a state (like some kind of static structure); it is an 
activity or acting (or working), and so an action or work open to investigation by 
the sciences or arts. If potential and actual then, can be predicated of nouns (or 
be determined as qualities of things, objects) and verbs (or ways of acting), then 
it is because being-one is, potentially and actually, both what a thing is and how 
it is, that is, its way of being and becoming. So, on the one hand, a thing (like a 
stone) is actually one, and one of those things that we see and investigate and 
know to be indivisibly one, that manifests itself as the act of being a stone; but a 
stone is potentially a statue, and continuously inseparable from its potential 
(which is constantly present), even if it actually comes to presence in the act or 
event of being carved into what becomes a statue, in the event that works the 
stone up into the work of art. On the other hand, in seeing, the seer is 
continuously one with the seeing, actualizing the action in the act and inseparable 
therefrom, and the deed is the actualization of the end, so that in seeing, we see 
and have seen (just as, in understanding, we understand and have understood; or 
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in living well, we have lived well)—but in actions such as dieting (learning or 
treating illness), the doer is discontinuously one with the end (knowledge or 
weight-loss), an end which is not yet present in the activity. And the unity of the 
world is potential and actual in both senses: on the one hand, the world is 
potentially one insofar as its constitution is in constant historical genesis, 
continuously being realized in correlation, in the process of becoming, of coming 
to presence and going out into absence; on the other hand, the world is actually 
one, an indivisible absolute unity, and the unity of the world is accomplished 
insofar as it is, so that even in becoming one, it is and has been one, or in coming 
to presence its unity is and has been present. Thus, potentially the world is not 
yet one, but constantly being constituted-as and constitutive-for its unity (and 
inner-worldly units, objects and concepts, gifts and givers, as well as for the worlds 
of the arts and sciences) on the ground of original difference, the correlation of 
us and world; and actually it is and has been one, the absolute unity of itself and 
its other, the unity of its identity and difference, its becoming and being, its genesis 
and structure, which is how it can show itself as one, even as it is and becomes 
another. 
Fourth, unity in the sense of the categories is not just one category among 
others, nor a genus of species (category of categories); nor is it merely a function 
of the subject (form or matter of judgment, statement, or predication) nor simply 
the shape of the object or concept—rather, unity means being one in any 
category whatsoever; so, in quality or quantity, essence or relation, place or time, 
action or affection. But the relation between unity and the categories is neither 
equivocal nor univocal nor analogical; rather, every category is one in relation 
to, πρὸς ἕν, the unity that is implied (qua terminus) in each one. For the unity of 
every unit (and the being of each being) necessarily implies (πρὸς) unity (ἕν). And 
that is how a category can be implicated in what it categorizes; how health can 
be predicated of, or constitutive for the healthy, for everything healthy implies 
the unity of health; or how the definition, λόγος or ὁρισμός, of health can imply 
that to which or in which anything healthy is directed as a border or boundary. 
Thus, unity is not only a category, nor merely what allows each category to be 
one; it is just as much what is implied by everything that is—which is how the 
world (and everything inner-worldly) can be, or come to presence, in accordance 
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with the categories, categorized; so that the categorical unity of the world can 
manifest itself consistently, and be investigated by the natural and human 
sciences, and the arts, and announce itself as what is continuous about the world, 
insofar as it continues to be one. 
And so there are four ways in which the world is one: accidentally, 
unnecessarily, but being one nonetheless; truly being one, how the world is, or its 
way of being given and always already having been given as one; potentially 
being one, and so becoming what it is, one, and/or actually being one and so 
also having been one; categorically, that is, as coming to presence or present as 
constituted in accordance with the categories of anything that is. 
But the unity of these four senses of unity, the one in many, is irreducible to 
anyone of them—it is neither simply accidental or true, nor merely potential or 
actual or categorical. But nor is it all of them taken together, gathered into a 
whole of which they parts, or a genus of which they are species, or a totality of 
totalities. Nor is unity just a unit. Rather, unity is that toward which they are all 
directed, πρὸς ἕν, that which is necessarily implied by each; and from which they 
all come, which implies them all, just as it is implicated in each. In this way, unity 
is inseparable from any of the senses of unity, and from itself, and from each unit, 
or unified being, even things such as humans and stones, ideas and concepts, 
words and deeds, one world or another, what is inside a world and out, as well as 
the borders and boundaries of any world whatsoever—although we can, in the 
natural or human sciences, or the arts, separate the inseparable, that is, abstract 
units, their identities and differences, relations and correlations, or cut-up and 
divide the indivisible. But the task is, far more, to think the unity of unity, of the 
unity implied by any way of thinking unity—for just as beings imply (πρὸς) being, 
units imply unity; and just as being is implied in beings, unity is in units (which 
implicates it, thereby, in how each is one). 
So, what is this unity—that which Husserl thinks as absolute-unity (1939, 
§92)—such that it can be the unity of the world? What is the unity of unity—if it 
is neither psychological-cognitive nor social-political normativity, neither 
abstract empirical-material rules nor merely formal-logical laws, neither just real 
nor ideal, outer (derived from sensation or perception or experience of external 
things, objects) nor inner, historical nor structural, neither just static nor genetic, 
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nor some permutation or combination of both—so that it can be the unity of any 
unity whatsoever, whether accidental or true, potential or actual or categorical; 
and so that each unit (the world, any world, inner-worldy unities, us, our 
horizons, closed or open, at motion or at rest, our arts and sciences, experiences 
and feelings, dreams and thoughts), and unity itself, can be one? 
Aristotle answers: the unity of unity is indivisibility, ἀδιαίρετος.31 So the unity 
of the world consists in being indivisible; and therefore, inseparable from itself. 
For it is this unity, which is the unity of metaphysics qua ontology (or rather, onto-
henology), is itself neither a genus, such as unitariness or wholeness or oneness; 
nor a unit, such as part or substance, or whole, or whole of wholes—although it 
is that from which the separation of units and substances (like the mortal and im-
mortal, the finite and the in-finite, the closed and the open, part and whole, 
totality and non-totality, species and genera; and their unification or 
reunification, their taking-part or participating, relating or correlating, that 
allows the world to be separate, χωριστός, from us, from other inner-worldly 
beings, and from other worlds) comes. In other words, indivisibility is the unity 
of unity, which is how it can show itself, announces itself, make itself manifest, 
come to presence as the separability and inseparability, divisibility and 
indivisibility, of anything that is (even unity itself). Thus, what is continuous in 
the unity of the world, the ‘common root’ or ‘one in many’ of the continuous 
structure of world-history and the continuous history of the world’s structure, as 
well as any possible investigation thereof, whether in the natural or human 
sciences or the arts—this is indivisibility, that is, the unity of being. 
UNITY AS IMPLICATION 
Unity then, means indivisibility. And so, the history of philosophy as onto-
henological metaphysics announces, in a certain way, what is (and has been): not 
only is the world one, but it must be one, if it is to be, in anyway whatsoever; and 
what is continuous about (the being and becoming) of the unity of the world is 
 
31 Aristotle 1894, 1102a31; 1957, 1052b16; Aubenque 1962, 36n2, 305-310. It is this irreducible unity of 
unity, this implied unity, that Aubenque names: ‘original unity [unité originaire]’ (1962, 496). 
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that it is indivisible.32 But how so? 
In fact, with regard to the world, the indivisibility of its unity shows itself as 
inseparable. Or, if the world is one—and it is one, if it is at all—and the world is 
indivisible in its being; then the being of the world is inseparable from the world. 
For the world is one because its unity cannot be separated from what is one, 
namely, the world (which is how we can also think and experience it as ideally 
separate, as pure εἶδος, pure ἰδέα, pure possibility, pure a priori; or split it up into 
parts and wholes, whether finite or infinite, limited or unlimited, in motion or at 
rest, in order to investigate or use it as abstractly separate, whether in the sciences 
or arts). Thus, from Aristotle to Husserl, unity continues to be understood in 
accordance with the way of thinking that ‘animated Greek philosophy from its 
beginnings’—not only in terms of indivisibility, but just as much, in terms of 
inseparability. 
And like indivisibility, inseparability manifests itself accidentally, truly, 
potentially-actually, and categorically. First, if the unity of the world is accidental, 
if the world (and our experience thereof) shows itself as divisible, or not; then it 
is because divisibility is inseparable from the real world, which is how things in 
the world, inner-worldly beings, can be continuously divided and joined, stopped 
and started, presented and represented. Second, the truth is inseparable from 
what is true: the unity of the world cannot be separated from the world—on the 
contrary, truth is inseparability (the being one of concept and object, empirical 
and transcendental, res cogito and res extensa, thought and thing, and so the 
‘common root’ of correspondence or correlation, adaequatio or ὁμοίωσις, true and 
false, right and wrong, accuracy and inaccuracy, honesty and lies). Third, 
potentiality and actuality are inseparable from the world: on the one hand, the 
world is inseparable from itself, at least if it is a potential or actual world; on the 
 
32 This is why ‘phenomenology properly carried through is the truly universal ontology’ (Husserl 1939, 
§93b), and not just a method for intuiting essences; and it is the truly universal henology—for it is 
metaphysics (or first philosophy, φιλοσοφία πρώτη) qua onto-henology. As Husserl insists: ‘Finally, I wish to 
point out—so as to avoid misunderstandings—that phenomenology excludes only that naive type of 
metaphysics which operates with absurd things in themselves, but it does not exclude metaphysics 
altogether’ (Hua 1, 38-39). Indeed: ‘Phenomenology is anti-metaphysical insofar as it rejects any metaphysics 
that moves in empty formal substructions’ (Hua 9, 253; see Hua 5, 141); but it is ‘pro-metaphysical’ insofar 
as it moves in the full concrete constitution of the unity of the world. 
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other hand, the world is inseparable from its act, whether it is in the process of 
becoming what it is or is not—or if it has become that which it is and has been, 
one, a unity.33 Fourth, the world (and everything therein) is inseparable from the 
categories—and each category, being one (like anything categorized from which 
any category is inseparable, including the world) is inseparable from the world 
(and everything therein). Thus, unity is inseparable from the world, from its way 
of being and becoming—for unity is ‘“necessary and universal in the strict sense”, 
“admitting of no possible exception” (Kant)’ (Husserl 1939, §89). 
But how is unity (understood as indivisibility and inseparability) in the world? 
Does it merely participate in some kind of (other or different, somehow separate 
or separable, ‘Platonically speaking’) ideal unity? Or does unity determine every 
kind or species of unit? And how is the unity of the world to be thought? Or what 
must unity be, so that it can be (and be constitutive of) the unity of the world? In 
other words, how is unity—as necessary and universal in the strict sense—to be 
thought? 
Perhaps a hint from Aristotle: ‘being and unity are the same and of one nature 
[τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ταὐτὸν καὶ μία φύσις] as they imply one another [τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν 
ἀλλήλοις]’.34 But what does that mean? To imply? To be implied? So, to implicate 
or be implicated? Or more precisely, to be an implication? 
In fact, Aristotle is quite clear: an implication is not a λόγος; it is not definition 
or meaning, value or measure, explanation or argument, expression or utterance, 
speech or subject-matter, word or law—and it is not ground or abyss, neither 
presence nor absence, neither happening nor non-happening. To imply is not 
λέγειν; it is neither to reason or calculate, nor to give an account or narrative, nor 
merely to speak or to think, nor just to lay-out or gather-up. Rather, implication 
 
33 The attempt to think the unity of horizon and world on the ground of one of the (somehow privileged-
preferred) four senses of unity (and being), such as potentiality-actuality, is bound to fail (Walton 2003, 2; 
Gurwitsch 2010, 399n84); rather, we must seek the unity of all these senses—that is, indivisibility—out of 
which they come, and on the basis of which horizon and world can be one at all (just as we have sought to 
think the unity of being as οὐσία understood as presence—not simply substantia). 
34 Aristotle 1957, 1003b22-23; see also, Derrida 1972, 40, 67; Haas 2018a. And not just onto-henology; but 
rather, onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology understood as the study of being and unity, time and aspect. 
Interestingly, it seems that Heidegger thought time as the how of being as early as 1923-4—for he writes: 
‘Dasein is temporal…past-present and future are not dimensions shoved next to one another, but instead 
determine the how of Dasein in a unitary way’ (GA 17, 319). 
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is the way that unity is, the how of unity—and how being is, insofar as being and 
unity are the same. Thus, implication is (not just a what, but) how unity (and being) 
is, and is inseparable from the world; as much as how, being one, the world is 
indivisible. But what does that mean? 
Perhaps a few clues, a few clues to implication, a few clues for thinking the 
unity (and being) of the world, and unity (and being) itself. For unity and being 
are the same, and are one thing, insofar as they imply one another. So everything 
said, here and now, about being must be said again, or also already, about unity—
and about the (being and) unity of the world. Three clues: (1) a clue to the unity 
of inner-worldly beings, (2) a clue to the unity of inner-worldly beings and the 
world, (3) a clue to the unity of unity. 
The first clue, from Homer, to the unity of inner-worldly beings: at the end of 
the Illiad, the dead Patroclus comes to Achilles—or more precisely, he neither 
comes nor fails to come, neither comes to presence as himself nor remains in 
absence. Patroclus is neither here nor there; being dead, he is neither simply the 
same (as when he was alive, a living presence), nor merely different; he neither 
simply appears and makes himself manifest, nor does he fail to appear and refuse 
self-manifestation. For the (dead) friend has the same look and sound, form and 
shape, εἶδος—but he is not the same; or he is different, but not different, like but 
unlike. And this is why he remains distant, τῆλε, neither far nor close, neither real 
nor ideal—for lacking life (heart, mind, will, passion, φρήν), he is ungraspable; or 
lacking presence, he is almost nothing, like smoke, vapor, καπνὸς—but he is not 
nothing (Homer 1920, 23.72, 104). For the dead (friend) is a third thing, tertium 
datur, τρίτον τι (Plato 1995, 250b8); and Homer names this—not just soul, ψυχή, 
that which is present in or absent from the body, whether mortal or immortal—
but εἴδωλον, that is, a vision or apparition, image or illusion, phantom or spirit, 
dream or ghost (Homer 1920, 23.103). In other words, coming back to haunt him, 
the friend’s way of being (and having been) is revealed: (being) alive, Patroclus 
was present, actually or really or truly here; or absent, so potentially present there; 
but (being) dead, Achilles’ friend is neither here nor there, neither actually (or 
even potentially) present nor absent, neither really or truly (simply) now with or 
by him nor without or away and beyond (or above or below)—for the ghost is the 
clue to the neither/nor of friendship; and cutting both ways (like Peirce’s arrow, 
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1931-5, 4.264), death shows how the dead (friend) is, was, continues to be, implied 
in the life of the living (although untranslatable—at least without a certain kind 
of privileged and privileging violence—into the language and logic of presence 
and absence). For, on the one hand, because like giver and receiver of the gift (or 
parent and child, master and slave), no friend is alone (an island, monad, unit), 
purely separate or simply separable individual, object, being—so, implied by one 
another (a Doppelspiel or original difference), friends show themselves as 
inseparable; and Aristotle should not have said, ‘O friends, there is no friend’, ᾧ 
φίλοι οὐδεὶς φίλος—but rather, having ‘eaten salt together’, ‘O friends, there are 
only friends’ or more precisely, ‘O friends, no friend’—for friendship is a relation 
or correlation of inseparability.35 And on the other hand, friends show themselves 
as separable: difference and discontinuity is as essential to friendship as identity 
and continuity—for each friend is implicated in the other, in their life and 
thought, feeling and imagination, things and world, which is how each of us can 
carry ‘the voice of the friend’ with or by us, especially insofar as friendship is not 
just a matter of space or place, nor merely of opposition to enmity.36 For the 
‘common root’ of the friend is implication—but that which is implied can never 
just come to presence, nor remain in absence; it only fails to manifest what cannot 
be manifested, cannot reveal what remains concealed. In this way, the friend is 
neither just separate (nor inseparable) from me; or if we manifest ourselves as 
separated, it is because our separation comes out of our unity, which is how our 
friendship is one. And being a friend, being one of those things we call friends, 
means being implied: the other implies me, is implicated in me, in my words and 
 
35 Aristotle 1894, 1156b28; Diogenes Laertius 2013, V.21, 251-2; Derrida 1994, 17, 201, 221. As Bernet (1990, 
20) argues: the fundamental problem of phenomenology is that Husserl is ‘unable to account for the gift’, 
that is, for the gift of the world to the subject, and of the subject to the world—or rather, for the givenness 
of the gift in general. Heidegger’s response is well known: being (as the Es of the es gibt) gives itself, gives of 
itself as the possibility of being and beings (such as subject and world). But Heidegger is thereby unable to 
account for how so, for how being gifts, that is, for how being (like unity) is implied, an implication. 
36 Heidegger GA 2, §34. As Montaigne writes: ‘Si on me presse, continue-t-il, de dire pourquoi je l’aimais, je sens que 
cela ne se peut exprimer qu’en répondant: parce que c’était lui; parce que c’était moi’ (1595, 1.28). Or, as Nietzsche writes 
on the hermit: the friend is a third, neither self nor reflected-self, but other than both; which is why 
Zarathustra insists: ‘I do not teach you the neighbor, but the friend. The friend shall be your festival of the 
earth and an anticipation of the overman. I teach you the friend and his overflowing heart’ (1967, ‘Vom 
Freunde’ and ‘Von der Nächstenliebe’, Also sprach Zarathustra, Bk. I). 
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deeds, in what and how I am what and how I am, in who I am or become or 
have been; I imply the other; so the friend can be mine, come to presence or be 
(and have been) as a gift given to me, announce a present present to me, or absent 
from me, relate or correlate to me. Thus, insofar as we (friends) are one, we are 
implicated thereby; and the unity of friendship, if there is one, is how the 
experience or idea, givenness or constant, of friends and friendship can come to 
presence and be present or go out into absence and be absent—for the ghost of 
Patroclus is a clue to how the friend has always already only ever been implied.37 
The second clue then, from Fink (his language or language itself), to the unity 
of beings and the world, and so to the unity of being and the being of unity, a 
clue to how unity and being (as the same) are implied, a clue from an essay 
prefaced by Husserl’s extraordinary admission: 
I have carefully read through this essay at the request of the able 
editors of the Kant-Studien, and I am happy to be able to state that it 
contains no sentence which I could not completely accept as my own 
or openly acknowledge as my own conviction (Fink 2005, 178). 
For Fink writes of the first of all questions, the greatest mystery of all, the 
mystery of the being of the world itself: ‘our human being, the latter itself implying 
the being of the world just as the being of the world implies the being of man’ (Fink 
2005, 209; my emphasis). And here, Elverton’s translation is not ‘wrong’; it is 
‘right’, but nevertheless conceals the thing itself, namely, that which Fink and 
Husserl and phenomenology as a whole are trying to say. For, in truth, the text 
reads: ‘our human being, which simultaneously in itself implies world-being, as 
world-being human-being [unser menschliches Sein, das zugleich Weltsein in sich 
impliziert, wie Weltsein Menschsein].’ In other words, implication (the second one) is 
implied: we imply the world and it implies us. Fink does not write, ‘world-being 
implies human-being’; he writes ‘world-being human-being’—that is, ‘it us’. At 
 
37 And if friendship can serve as a clue to thinking unity, we should probably not be surprised if it implies 
(πρὸς) how we can think the unity (ἕν) of the world as well. For if the world is one, it is because unity is 
implied thereby, as well as implicated in how everything real joins together therein, how all things are given 
as separate or inseparable, divisible or indivisible. And this is also how the world can be constituted as the 
collective horizon for any possible investigation, as well as constitute any science (or art) as being one—
phenomenology included. 
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the very moment when being is at stake, when the relation or correlation of us 
and the world, the mystery of all mysteries, is in question—and the answer is that 
we imply one another, that human-being and world-being are implied by each 
other (at one and the same time, which implicates temporality and aspectuality 
thereby)—phenomenology resorts to implication. And if ‘implies’ is here implied, 
it is because Fink is demonstrating how to speak and think implication; he is 
showing what the thing itself means; as well as how to do it, how to imply without 
simply conforming to (the translations of) the language and logic of presence and 
absence, how to be implied (like a dead friend or a ghost) who is neither present 
nor absent. Thus, the unity of ‘it us’, the world and humans, the being of the world 
and the being of human beings, of ‘Weltsein Menschsein’, and the being of these 
beings, is implied, an implication—and its way of being one is implying, by 
implication. 
The third clue from Plato—or rather, from the Parmenides of the Parmenides, and 
his way of thinking the unity of unity, of thinking how it is one. For he says: ἓν ἕν 
(142c). And Cornford translates: ‘one [is] one’ (Plato 1985, 142c).38 But the dialogue 
just says: ‘one one’. And again, the translation is not ‘wrong’, but it covers-up the 
way in which the one is and is one (thereby conforming to, and complicit with, a 
certain traditional concealment and a somehow motivated privileging of, and 
 
38 Alternatively, Cornford translates: ‘One (is) one’ (PP, 142c). ‘Being’ lies between the one-one and the other-
one; although ‘in Greek the word “is” (the “copula”) can be omitted, as here’ (Cornford, PP, 136n1). In fact, 
implied being is common-place throughout Greek philosophy (and literature); for example, in Plato’s Laws 
(901c8-d2), ‘a single occurrence of einai provides the verb for three clauses, although in the first clause (where 
the verb occurs) the syntax is absolute and the meaning existential, whereas in the second and third clauses 
(where the verb is absent and must be supplied) the syntax is copulative with an adjectival predicate’ (Kahn 
2003, XIIn11). Heraclitus (DK, 62) also uses this: ‘immortals are mortal, mortals immortal, living the others’ 
death, dead in the others’ life [ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ 
ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες]’ (Kahn 1979, 71, my emphasis). But being is not there, not present in the text, 
although neither is it simply absent—rather, it is implied, and the text should read: ‘immortals mortal, 
mortals immortal, living the other’s death, dead in the other’s life.’ Indeed, ‘this is in point of form 
Heraclitus’ masterpiece, the most perfectly symmetrical of all the fragments. The first two clauses of two 
words each (with copula unexpressed [or more precisely, implied—a masterpiece of implication!] in Greek) 
are mirror images, identical but for the word order: a-b-b-a’ (Kahn 1979, 216). Unfortunately—or 
ironically—Plato’s Parmenides is neither simply satirical (logical exercise with a polemical purpose) nor 
pedagogical (logical exercise with a positive purpose), but metaphysical. For his part, Proclus (2007-17, 64k) 
ends his commentary at 142a, just before the ‘one one’—and no contemporary Plato commentaries, at least 
to my knowledge, deal with this issue. 
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preference for, the power of presence, and absence qua privation)—for the being 
of unity is (just) implied, an implication, which is why Plato writes: ‘the existent 
must have the “being” implied in “being existent”’.39 But if the being of unity is 
implied, and if being and unity are the same (implications), then ‘one one’ means: 
unity must be implied as much as being. For unity is not simply present in 
everything that is one, nor absent therefrom; it too is implied—just as the being 
of unity is implied (which is the ground on which it can then be translated into 
the language and logic of presence-absence, interpreted and reinterpreted as the 
coming-to-presence and going-out-into-absence of unity qua accidental, true, 
potential-actual and categorical, and investigated as the real and ideal unities and 
units of the arts and sciences). And this way of being one—which is how unity is 
one as well, or just ‘one one’—has multiple implications: unity is not a unit (nor a 
whole or part, subject or predicate, substance or attribute), but it is always the 
unity of what is and is not one, and of itself—for it is implied, which is how 
anything that is one (such as us and the world) can come to presence and go out 
into absence, οὐσία and ἀπουσία (Plato 1985, 163c) as indivisible or divisible, 
inseparable or separable.40 Thus, unity is implied by unity as its way of being 
unity. 
 
39 PP, 162a; my emphasis. In other words, to participate, μετέχω, μετέχονται, means to imply, to be implied; 
and participation is implication. Indeed, ideas are not simply separate from (or unrelated to) things; they 
are not in another world or space or time, so the real does not just partially or wholly participate in the 
ideal; rather, χωρίς as the difference which differentiates (distinguishes, divides, cuts, ὁρίζω) ideas from 
things, χωρίς is theirs: both are and are one, insofar as the boundary, ὅρος, between them belongs to both—
just as day and night, separated and joined by the horizon, ὁρίζων, are ways in which light comes to 
presence and goes out into absence, ways in which the Sun and Earth are in relation; just as the way of 
truth and the way of seeming are both Parmenidean ways of thinking and speaking, acting and being (one). 
For each idea (or form) is ‘one and different’ from the things of which they are the idea (or form), and different 
from each other, which is why ‘Socrates has to clarify to himself what is implied in being “one”’ (Scolnicov 
2003, 76; my emphasis). Thus, as Heidegger argues (against Husserl’s psychologism): it is not a matter of 
envisaging a gap between two worlds in order to cast a bridge over both, or solve a problem of one’s own 
invention, which is like trying to make a gun barrel by first taking an empty space and then wrapping steel 
around it; rather, it is a question of grasping implication as that which ‘makes possible both ways-of-being 
in their original unity’ (GA21, 93). 
40 Examples abound. Being is implied in poetry: ‘Beauty is truth, truth [is] beauty’ (Keats 1814-1891, 3.2, my 
emphasis; see also, Haas 2014). Being is implied in Russian, such as the first lines of Notes from Underground: 
Я человек больной... Я злой человек, ‘I [am] a sick man . . . I [am] a wicked man’ (Dostoyevski 1864, 1); 
and in many other languages, such as Hebrew. Being is implied in Heraclitus: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων (Diels 
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It is now, perhaps possible to respond to the question of why the world is 
one—because it is, and being and unity imply one another. And to the question 
of how the world is one—because unity is implied in and by the world, so that it 
can be, and so come to presence and go out into absence. And to the question of 
what this unity is—an implication which has its way of being implied, and 
implicating itself in the ways in which unity presents and represents itself. And 
this has implications for the onto-henological metaphysics of presence and 
absence which animates the history of philosophy from the Greeks to Husserl—
which implicates it in the thinking and acting, imagining and sensing of any 
possible unity of the human and natural sciences, and the arts—for it covers up 
a certain way of being one, namely, being implied. But the task is to consider 
what is implied thereby, and how so, and the implications thereof. 
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